This is a conceptual paper on police deviance and its multi-faceted forms. It seeks to address the lack of an adequately formulated framework in the literature of the breadth and depth of police misconduct and corruption. The paper argues for the use of a proposed 'sliding scale' of police deviance by examining the nature, extent and progression of police deviance and crime using research in Australia and Canada as illustrative case studies. This sliding scale is designed to research, capture, and store and hence extend the knowledge base of what constitutes police deviance at the level of the individual, the group and the organisational contexts of policing. As such, the conceptual framework is a robust yet flexible research tool and it's utility as a sliding scale constitutes a step forward in advancing the knowledge on police deviance and criminality through adopting an integrated and holistic approach to managing such knowledge.
Introduction
Deviance and criminality by police has been subjected to increasing research interest by scholars and practitioners over the last few decades. Generally such research efforts are clustered around notions of police deviance, police corruption, police crime, police misconduct and sometimes more specific labels like police brutality, police abuse, police ethics, and police integrity. What makes researching this important area of policing problematic is the lack of an agreed on framework to delineate the range, diversity and depth of what behaviours are involved in this notion of police deviance. This paper adopts a Knowledge Management (KM) approach to the problem of police deviance by presenting a conceptual framework that has the capacity to focus and integrate the various strands of research inquiry into this important domain of police criminality. Hence, this paper represents an initial research step towards providing a better theoretical understanding and thereby knowledge of the complexities involved in policing the police.
Conceptualising Police Deviance: Matrix Framework
In order to appreciate how a Knowledge Management (KM) perspective can illuminate our understanding of police deviance and crime a brief overview of the salient features of KM is necessary. KM is about the knowledge people possess in their heads and the various technological systems that can be used to explicate such tacit, experientially-learnt knowledge. Thus, KM involves both a philosophy, consisting of different conceptual orientations or approaches, and a practice or technological base that revolved around a set of distinct yet complementary processes to do with knowledge creation, capture, storage, retrieval, transfer, sharing, application, and integration. Furthermore, there are two main philosophical orientations (mechanistic and dynamic) which underpin KM. The mechanistic view equates KM with IT and adopts a 'platforms & programs' approach where the emphasis is on getting the right platform and software applications to harvest an organisation's knowledge. The dynamic perspective takes a 'context & culture' approach to KM. This dynamic orientation asserts that the only thing that can really be 'managed' about knowledge is the context and culture in which it occurs (Dean and Gottschalk, 2007) .
In this paper we adopt this dynamic orientation as the most appropriate KM perspective to adopt towards researching police deviance. This is because the organisational context of policing has its own unique police culture which in some circumstances can hinder the reporting of misconduct and corruption though the operation of a 'code of silence'. This 'code of silence' is commonly found in police forces all over the world (e.g., Miller 2006; Loyens, 2009) . Furthermore, Marche (2009:463) building on Klockars et. al (2000) analysis of survey data on police agency integrity found that 'police culture fosters corruption'.
Various typologies exist in the literature which classifies police deviance and corruption in many different forms. One of the earliest typologies by Roebuck and Barker (1974) ranges from corruption of authority, kickbacks, opportunistic theft, 'shakedowns' (bribes), protection of illegal activity, fixes (undermining criminal investigations), direct criminal activities (police crime), internal payoffs, 'flaking' or 'padding' (planting, adding to or tampering with evidence). Punch (2000) suggests additional forms of police crime like extreme violence, manipulating evidence, sexual harassment, racism, and police involvement in drug dealing. Klockars (1985) describes what is commonly referred to in police circles as the 'Dirty Harry Problem', that is the use of 'dirty means' to achieve 'good ends'. This is also known as a type of 'noble cause corruption'. In this regard much has been made of a 'noble cause' corruption where misconduct is justified in the name of good ends (Porter and Warrender, 2009; Caldero and Crank, 2004; Harrison, 1999) as one explanatory variable among others for police deviance. Porter and Warrender (2009) used an innovative approach in their attempt to develop a multivariate model of police deviance to examine 'combinations' of factors that shape police corruption. These researchers (Porter and Warrender, 2009 :88) using a multidimensional scalogram analysis (MSA) identified three 'types' of police deviance which they defined as Type A (police crime), Type B (noble cause misconduct) and Type C (corruption). While such a multi-factor approach is a noteworthy contribution to the complexities of research police deviance, the fundamental difficulty of having 'agreed on' definitions of what these 'Types' of police deviance represent and are composed of is still a problematic issue that underlies this multivariate model. For instance, as Porter and Warrender (2009:91) themselves note " However, it is recognized that this criteria of differentiating between Type A (police crime) and Type C (corruption) is particularly relaxed and that more stringent classification criteria could be used based on the size of the difference between the number of variables present for each type." It is further noted that, "the most frequent difference in the number of variables of each type for the cases was, however, a difference of one" (ibid).
Moreover, with regard to Type B (noble cause misconduct) this category was defined as offences that "were most likely to be evidence related (for example, ignoring, planting or removing evidence in order to secure a conviction)" (ibid). However, it could be equally argued that such 'misconduct' may in fact have little to do with a 'noble cause'. In some cases, the 'ignoring, planting or removing evidence' by a police officer may have more to do with assisting a criminal group to set up one of their criminal competitors for a crime that was perpetrated by them. In this situation the 'assisting' police officer would no doubt be suitably financially compensated by the criminal group. Hence, in this situation such personal gain by the police officer would then fall under either Type A (police crime) or Type C (corruption) in the Porter and Warrender police deviance typology. It certainly could not be considered as a 'noble cause' act.
Finally, a prominent theory regarding police deviance is the notion of a slippery-slope (O'Connor, 2005) . In that, once a police officer engages in even relatively small and minor violations of departmental rules like accepting a free meal or discounts, then they have taken the first steps towards other more serious forms of misconduct which can eventually lead them into a downward slide into major corrupt practices. This notion of a progression in police deviance and criminality is not captured by static typological classification schemes that seek hard and fast rules and precise definitions in order to operationalise various research methodologies.
Such classification schemes and theoretical notions have their merits and taken together create a mosaic of police deviance as perceived from different vantage points. However, what is missing in the literature is an organising framework that is robust and yet flexible enough to capture the knowledge about the nature, extent and progression of police deviance from different perspectives and at different levels.
Hence, in pursue of this objective, the following matrix diagram (Figure 1 ) has been developed by Dean in order to more appropriately conceptualise from a KM perspective the salient dimensions of police deviance.
Matrix Framework of Police Deviance Police Corruption
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Key element is the misuse of police authority for gain (eg. taking bribes, 'fixing' a criminal prosecution by leaving out relevant information, drug dealing, police abuse & brutality {aggressive stop & search, use of excessive force}, and so forth. Moreover, police corruption can also involve criminal collusion with organised crime and/or politicians. [Punch, 2003] Police proactively engage in predatory behaviour (eg. extorting money from the public or from criminals by providing protection and other 'services' to them. [Gerber and Mendelson, 2008] 'rotten apple' theory (individualistic model of human failure)
'rotten orchards' theory of systemic corruption (institutionalized model of systemic failure) As can be seen in Figure 1 police deviance is often viewed as a 'slippery slope' (O'Connor, 2005) whereby there is a gradual deterioration of social-moral inhibitions accompanied by a perceived sense of permissibility for deviant conduct amongst police. However, this 'slope' can also be seen as a two-dimensional matrix. In that, on the horizontal axis at one end of the matrix is 'police misconduct' and at the other end is 'predatory policing' with 'police corruption' somewhere in the middle on this horizontal dimension.
Police Misconduct
Some may argue that the term 'predatory policing' as introduced by Gerber and Mendelson (2008) into the literature on police deviance is just another label for 'police corruption' as extortion by police for personal gain is also part and parcel of corrupt police practices. While this is the case to some extent, we believe the notion of 'predatory policing' has more substantive merit. In that, it draws attention to the 'proactive' nature of police corruption. For instance, when some police officers move from an accepting of bribes (kick backs) and so forth from criminals to turn a blind eye to illegal gambling or prostitution rackets and so on to a more active soliciting of protection money from criminals and/or the public. Such a role change from a passive acceptance to an active approaching is a qualitative difference that we argue makes a world of difference. This essential difference is what is captured in the notion of 'predatory policing' which delineates it from much of what can be more appropriately considered as 'police corruption' bribery, theft, fraud, tax evasion, racketeering (Ivkovich, 2003) . Extortion, while also part of police corruption, in our view where it is instigated by police in a proactive manner then it should be considered more appropriately as predatory in nature. Indeed, much of what we call police corruption if it has a proactive element to it can be considered as nearer to the predatory policing end of the horizontal dimension of our police crime continuum.
However, on the vertical axis as is apparent in Figure 1 , at the top end of the matrix is the 'individual' while at the bottom end is the 'organisation' and the movement of the individual from top to bottom is mediated through the 'group'. That is, the work of an organisation is carried out through group processes in the main, rarely does an individual within an organisational context, especially in policing, work exclusively as an independent entity.
Furthermore, it will also be evident from a study of Figure 1 where there is no clear or direct material benefit to the officer involved.
In the light of these definitional difficulties, we argue that a modest degree of conceptual clarity between these three different forms of police deviance is still possible if one considers the primary nature of the type of police deviance involved.
As can be seen on Figure 1 , the primary distinguishing feature in our matrix framework for the different forms of police deviance is indicated by the keywords being underlined for each of the categories. That is, the essence of police misconduct is violations of agreed standards enshrined in various departmental rules and policies and norms of civil behaviour in society. In essence, such misconduct is what some researchers might regard as a 'police integrity' issue, where integrity is defined as the quality of being honest and morally upright. Integrity is sometimes defined as the absence of misconduct (Cossette, 2004) .
Whereas, in so far as police corruption is concerned it is the misuse of police authority which is a central feature of corrupt practices. Again, in terms of Prenzler's typology (2009) such misuse of authority can be regarded as "classic corruption"
which involves officers misusing their position for personal benefit. Bribery, for example, involves payment for officers not doing their duty. Moreover, "excessive force" or "brutality" (Prenzler, 2009 ) also involve the misuse of authority and cover a wide range of forms of unjustified force. For instance, this can be anything from "rough handling" -such as excessive frisking -through to serious assault, torture, and murder.
With regard to predatory policing it is the proactive nature of the illegal behaviours that distinguishes this form of police deviance from the other categories. Skogan and Meares (2004) note that where police officers seek the means to engage in corrupt behaviour that this is also regarded as a form of 'proactive' corruption. In sum, as noted above, while such distinctions can be drawn conceptually, in reality considerable operational overlap occurs as one form of police deviance can merge into another form at various times and in various contexts.
In so far as our police deviance matrix is concerned, it is clear that a lot of what is found in the literature on police crime is mostly examples of an 'individual' naturein the sense of being committed by individuals for their own personal gain. Hence, these types of police crime are at the police misconduct end on the horizontal axis.
Such individualistic examples provide support for the view that this type of police crime can be viewed from the lens of the 'rotten apple' theory of corruption. In that, it is inevitably the case that in any organisation there will be those individuals who behave like rotten apples some of the time due to personal greed, moral weakness or similar motivations but the full barrel of apples is essential unspoilt. Or some variation of this 'rotten apple' theme like 'rogue cop'.
However, it is clear on Figure 1 there are a number of theoretical perspectives contained in our conceptualisation of police deviance and not just the 'rotten apple' metaphor, which is short-hand for an individualistic model of police deviance (Perry, 2001 ). This 'rotten apple' metaphor has been extended to include the group level view of police cultural deviance with a 'rotten barrel' metaphor (O'Connor, 2005) .
Finally, Punch (2003) has pushed the notion of 'rotten orchards' to highlight police deviance at the systemic level. Punch (2003:172) notes, 'the metaphor of "rotten orchards" indicates that it is sometimes not the apple, or even the barrel, that is rotten but the system (or significant parts of the system)'. That is, deviance that has become systemic is:
… in some way encouraged, and perhaps even protected, by certain elements in the system. …. "Systems" refers both to the formal system -the police organization, the criminal justice system and the broader socio-political context -and to the informal system of deals, inducements, collusion and understandings among deviant officers as to how the corruption is to be organized, conducted and rationalized." (Punch, 2003:172) These metaphorical extensions represent increasing deeper level meanings associated with police crime. For instance, in regard to the 'rotten apple' thesis this level of explanation for police deviance is as Perry (2001: 1) notes "…most major inquiries into police corruption reject the 'bad-apple' theory: 'The rotten-apple theory won't work any longer. Corrupt police officers are not natural-born criminals, nor morally wicked men, constitutionally different from their honest colleagues. The task of corruption control is to examine the barrel, not just the apples, the organisation, not just the individual in it, because corrupt police are made, not born.' " Furthermore, Punch (2003:172) makes the point that "The police themselves often employ the "rotten apple" metaphor -the deviant cop who slips into bad ways and contaminates the other essentially good officers -which is an individualistic, human underworld criminals involved mainly in the prostitution racket (Fitzgerald Report, 1987-89) . Further inquiries by the Criminal Justice Commission in Queensland some ten years later in 1997 through Justice Carter (Carter, 1997) and in 1999 found evidence of police involvement in the illegal drug market (CJC, 1999 
Case Study: Police Deviance and Criminality in Canada
The context of Canadian policing like the country itself is large and diverse. With more than 257 police departments in Canada, the Canadian policing community can best be described as a complex and diverse blend of municipal, regional, state and federal law enforcement agencies. The most notable of which is the RCMP, which is steeped in tradition and dates back to 1873, the RCMP's 26,000 sworn members are charged with providing police services at the municipal, state and federal levels.
While the RCMP is contracted by state and municipal governments to provide a policing presence in these jurisdictions, it is worth noting that many municipalities have established their own municipal police services independent to the RCMP.
Oversight of these independent municipal services is performed by a police board which is chaired by the Mayor for the municipality, while oversight for the RCMP is Some five months later and following the resignation of the same police commissioner, a criminal investigation was conducted by the Ottawa Police Service (OPS). The investigation by the OPS confirmed serious cases of nepotism and wasteful spending. In a separate investigation of the matter by the Auditor General it was determined that millions of dollars in inappropriate charges had been made to the pension and insurance plans. It remains to be seen if any significant criminal charges will be laid as a result of these investigations.
Such matters point to the inability of the RCMP to fully examine the scope of misconduct and corruption within the RCMP at the organisational level. These findings further demonstrate the growing need for an independent commission of inquiry in relation to systemic corruption within the RCMP.
Finally, although a number of mechanisms exist within Canada to address the issue of police corruption, it is still the case that each of theses internal, criminal and civil systems is by and large remedial in nature. Very little evidence can be found that supports a preventative approach to police misconduct and police corruption within the context of Canadian public sector policing.
Researching Police Deviance: Sliding Scale
In the light of the findings of the comparative reviews of police crime and its deviant forms in Australia and Canada it is clear that attempts to root out police deviance is by and large fragmented, episodic in nature, and overly-focused on an individualistic approach to dealing with police crime. This individualistic model of finding and charging 'rotten apples' makes for easy targets but does little to address other far more serious types of police crime that involve entrenched and systemic corrupt practices and predatory policing. For instance, the Wood Commission defines corruption as both systemic, in so far as it was self-perpetuating and entrenched, when corrupt officers have alliances in place to defend their corrupt network from inquiries or interference (Wood 1977) .
Therefore, in order to more adequately address the breadth and depth of police crime a research instrument is proposed based on the matrix framework presented in figure   1 . This research instrument comprises a five-point 'sliding scale' of police deviance.
Furthermore, this sliding scale is designed to capture the breadth and depth of what constitutes police deviance at the level of the individual, the group and the organisational contexts of policing. This research scale is illustrated in figure 2 below. To take the varying thickness of the lines on the 'Individual Scale' as an example, the 'most thick (strong) line' occurs in the segment between points 1 to 2 on this scale.
Sliding Scale of Police Deviance
That is, one would expect from the research reviewed for this paper that at the police misconduct end of the scale (somewhere along the scale of segment 1 to 2) that 'individual' police officers will figure more prominently on the 'individual (rotten apples) scale' than on the other two scales below -that is, the group and systemic scales in so far a police misconduct is concerned.
The hypothesising is similar for the rest of the scales. In that, most of the evidence for a 'rotten barrel' or group level of police deviance is more likely to be found in the form of police corruption practices as indicated by the strong thickness of the lines between the segments 2 -3 and 3 -4 on the 'Group Scale'. Whilst, the 'medium' thick line at the point 5 end of the group scale indicates that to a slightly lesser degree some of this police corruption will spill over into forms of predatory policing for some police officers. Other corrupt police will be content to just misuse their authority for personal gain and not get too greedy by extending their deviance into more proactive predatory corrupt practices.
With regard, to the least (weak) thick line of the group scale being at the beginning of segment 1-2 a note of caution as to how this should be interpreted is in order. This weak occurrence of police deviance at the group level does not mean that individuals are not strongly corrupted at this point. Indeed, they may well have engaged in quite of lot of police misconduct on the individual scale. But this should not be assumed.
For instance, when a new officer joins for example a vice squad, such squads are notorious for having the potential to engage in corrupt practices. The constant association with criminal gangs and organised crime networks responsible for much of the rackets to do with the illicit drug trade and illegal prostitution markets and so forth make vice squad very susceptible to police corruption. Hence, new officer might not have been engaged in police misconduct upon entering such a squad but his or her continuance in such a squad may well depend of become corrupt if approached by a corrupt officer to take a bribe. For example, failure to take the bribe results in classic in-group behaviour defensive tactics, such as, marginalisation (Jones & Carson, 2004 , Cacciola, 2009 , threats or active attempts to destroy the officer's career (Fitzgerald, 1989) .
In this regard, corrupt police develop a 'rat cunning' much like the criminal counterparts in the underworld. Hence, corrupt police networks can use the 'rotten apple' theory to their criminal advantage against a police organisation that becomes too determined to root out corruption. They can achieve this by offering up a 'corrupt officer' or even a few officers depending on the heat of the anti-corruption purge to appease the public demand for crack-downs on corruption. Cacciola recounts how regular attempts were made to frame him not only to divert attention away from other illegal activity by fellow officers, but to discredit him as a potential witness (Cacciola,
2009).
It is a similar tactic they use for 'protecting' illegal brothels. Corrupt police arrange for girls, low status prostitutes and brothel receptionists, to take turns being arrested so the vice squad can maintain an arrest rate (Fitzgerald, 1989) . Moreover, the benefit to a police force can be that it is able to regularly identify and discipline sacrificial officers to create a public perception that action was being taken. Furthermore, corrupt police can also claim that corruption was being identified and stopped before it developed into sophisticated networks thereby allaying fears of systemic or entrenched corruption.
On another note, the potential for corruption exists in all government agencies and can be categorised as either 'wet' or 'dry'. Wet agencies are those that are ideal for corruption because they involve a high degree of discretion as opposed to dry agencies which have no discretion (Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002) . Thus an agency such as police or customs which involves a great deal of decision making on the part of their officers provides many opportunities for illegal operators to bribe officers to make particular decisions which assist their crimes. Alternatively, a purely clerical job provides almost no opportunities to either use discretion or assist criminal activity. Within wet agencies some positions are wetter than others. For example, a member of the vice squad not only has discretion but makes decisions over highly profitable illegal activity. Thus he or she not only has the ability to assist criminals but the criminals have the wealth to induce the officer into participating in corruption.
Arguably an officer working on the rail squad, while not immune from corruption, is less likely to face opportunities where they are bribed and far less exposed to the amounts of cash that could influence their behaviour.
With regard to the third 'Systemic Scale', the strong thick line occurs more at the predatory end of police deviance. Hence, we can take the analogy of 'wet' and 'dry' environments in government agencies like the police further by saying that predatory policing occurs when officers actively pursue corruption by irrigating their environment to create 'wet' opportunities. Entrenched corruption on the other hand, occurs when officers protect their control over the wet job; they in effect build a dam to store up and control the water asset. Allegations have been made that, during the 1980s, the NSW police eliminated the criminal competitors in order to control the drug trade in Sydney (Wood 1997) . Similarly, the Queensland Police Commissioner, Terry Lewis, effectively extorted money from operators of illegal prostitution and gambling; they could not operate unless they paid (Fitzgerald 1989) .
Moreover, there is a further connection between passive police corruption and proactive predatory policing. The entrepreneur or corruption broker is a facilitator of bribery. This person's knowledge and connections of the system makes them valuable as a point at which people who want protection or predatory police who are seeking opportunities can approach to develop new or expand existing corrupt networks. As
Burt explains, a broker has the "information on available goods, sellers, buyers, and prices" that he/she can use to assist isolated networks (police squads and organised criminals) to link up and work together (Burt 2005) .
In terms of the Australian context and specifically the state of Queensland the classic corruption broker according to the findings of the Fitzgerald Inquiry (1989) was Jack
Herbert. Herbert was a former Queensland police and member of the Licensing Branch (the equivalent of a vice squad). Having left the force under a cloud he maintained his connections. After period of anti-corruption crackdowns, the political situation changed and people tried to re-establish corrupt networks. Herbert was the conduit between gambling and prostitution operators and the police. He was approached by both and facilitated the arrangements between each side and the creation of protection networks in the senior ranks of the Queensland Police Force (Herbert and Gilling: 2004) . In metaphorical terms, Herbert built an aqueduct between those who wanted to pay and those who could provide the protection.
Finally, it should be noted with regard to this 'sliding scale' research instrument that the relative strength of police deviance varies on each scale at the individual, group and systemic levels depending on type and depth of police crime engaged in at that level. The notion of the 'slippery slope' of police deviance is also reflected in such research hypothesising.
Discussion
There is a pattern we have both seen, experienced personally and discerned darkly in the literature as to how police organisations and Governments deal with and respond to allegations of police misconduct and corruption which requires further analysis if the proposed research instrument presented in the previous section is to be effectively utilised.
As noted in both Australia and Canada apart from the official police and watchdog agency reports on the extent of police misconduct in their ranks, there is very little official reporting of the more sinister levels of police corruption and predatory practices. These episodic revelations of group and systemic corruption often only come about as a result of a competent investigative journalist uncovering some element of corrupt practices by police. Such media-driven revelations are certainly the case in Australia.
We have also noted from personal experience that the usual response by police executives when such revelations occur in the Daily News and on TV takes the form of a series of graduated responses as pressure builds on them to do something about such revelations of police crime. This pattern of response by police organisations and Governments of the day regardless of political colour generally follows our analysis as set out below:
1. The police executive caste doubt that the 'story' has any real truth to it by implying it is just another example of the media 'beating up' a story to get some sensationalism going (Dickie 1988 ).
However, if this does not work in the short-term, then the police management will go the next step, which is -2. To release a statement saying that the 'matter in question' or 'alleged allegation' has been referred to some internal investigation unit like an 'Ethical Standards Section' or a 'Internal Police Complaints Unit' in order to carry out a full and proper investigation to determine the extent, if any, of the alleged incident of misconduct and/or corruption by an individual member of the police. Queensland Police Commissioner Terry Lewis created his own Internal Investigations Section to investigate police misconduct; it made adverse findings in approximately 2% of cases and never recommended serious sanctions (Fitzgerald 1989) .
Accompanying this statement, there is often the additional comment that if it is found after this full and transparent investigation that some officer has behaved in an unlawful manner then the full weight of appropriate disciplinary action will be taken against him or her. Again, for most police complaints this type of organisational response will stop the media campaign there.
However, if the investigative journalist is able to gather more ammunition then the 'little ripple' in the pond can become a 'huge wave' that washes over the police management to such an extent that 'politicians' get involved.
Governments, of all political persuasions, then go into 'damage control' mode and respond with -3. A range of control strategies which generally take the form of giving 'unqualified support' to police executives in their quest to leave 'no stone unturned' in identifying and rooting out the one or two 'rotten apples' in the police. Often the rotten apples are scapegoated honest officers (Fitzgerald 1989) .
However, if this does not turn the tide the Government's way then politicians start to look at who they can 'blame' for this tidal wave of public dissatisfaction against them over the continuing revelations of wide scale misconduct and/or corruption within police ranks. This change in direction by the Government of the day will take the following forms -4. The Government announces that it will now take over the investigation from the police and give it to an 'independent' body to continue the investigation of alleged police misconduct/corruption. If such Independent Bodies do not exist with the machinery of the State or Nation like Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in New South Wales or the Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC) in Queensland in Australia, then the next and the final response left to the Government of the day is to announce -5. Setting up an 'independent' Judicial Inquiry (JI) or even a Royal Commission (RC), if the public pressure is substantial, to look into the allegations of police crime. In some instances, the politicians in power will try to influence the outcome of such a JE or RC by appointing the person to head the Enquiry and/or Commission who is known to be a 'tame' (ie. pro-government or at least, politically conservative) retired judge or other suitably qualified professional.
Evidence of this pattern can also be discerned in the literature reviewed for this paper.
For instance, with regard to Canadian policing an examination of the CPC review process clearly suggests that considerable emphasis is placed on the personal conduct of RCMP officers while very little effort is directed towards the investigation of systemic police corruption within the service. This is hardly a surprising finding when one considers that the RCMP Research and Evaluation Branch (2006) define police corruption simply as:"...the lack of police integrity. It also constitutes one of the most significant obstacles to positive police-public relations in today's society" (Grant, 2002:12) . The above quote shows how simplistic and woefully inadequate such a 'definition' of police corruption is by the RCMP and hence its own 'blind spots' in its anti-corruption efforts. Clearly, with this sort of narrow view no wonder the RCMP focus on police crime is almost entirely directly to the 'individual' end of the scale.
Furthermore, Tiffen (2004) found that in the State of New South Wales in Australia the most prolific areas for institutionalized police corruption were the enforcement of so-termed 'victimless crime', which includes abortion, prostitution, illegal drugs, illegal gambling, restrictions on alcohol consumption, and homosexuality Moreover, it is also evident in reviewing the literature which is available through open sources with specific reference to police misconduct and police corruption in Canada, that the ongoing practice of 'police investigating police' has done very little to relieve public concerns surrounding procedural transparency and public accountability. Also, the absence or inability to provide an accurate measurement of corruption has itself posed a significant barrier to the effective management of police corruption (Moran, 2002:137) . This absence of quantifiable criteria which can be used to determine the scale of police corruption lends weight to the argument that the RCMP complaint process is subjective and fails to adequately address the varying degrees of police criminality within the service. Ivkovich (200:593) notes that:
"… the degree of success of a reform is often determined on the basis of its political appeal and the absence of subsequent scandals, rather than on the true impact the reform has had on the actual corruption in the agency."
In relation to policing context in Australia, it is equally clear that all of the big three States, New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland are states that have an unenviable track record in relation police crime. A cogent argument can be made that there is a need to periodically reform, certainly every five years or so, the police organisations in these States in relation to police misconduct, corruption and predatory police practices. What is so troublesome about this argument is that the extent and depth of police crime at the more serious end of entrenched corruption and predatory practices still regularly surfaces in these States. This is in spite of the fact that each of these States have in place some type of 'independent' watchdog agencies whose sole reason for existence is to identify and stop such corrupt practices. Hence, a reasonable speculation is that perhaps too much time and effort is spent by watchdog organisations picking up 'rotten apples' rather than searching the fields for 'rotten orchards' by detecting and dismantling corrupt police networks.
As for further research in this area, the principal author and other colleagues are currently engaged in a content analysis of court records of prosecuted police officers in order to better understand the set of relationships and causal mechanisms involved in various forms of police deviance. Researching police criminality involves untangling several variables to do with the role, age, and gender of police officers as well as the organisational structure and police culture as all these variables influence to differing degrees the types of crime committed by police and the motives involved.
To take one such example of untangling variables, the variable of police culture contains what has often been referred to as a 'code of silence'. This is a key factor in so far as researching police deviance is concerned. For instance, conformity to the code of silence was found in the Victorian Armed Offenders Squad in Australia by the Office of Police Integrity (OPI, 2008) . The code of silence was reinforced by those in the 'brotherhood' through implied or explicit threats of reprisals, exploiting fears of being shunned or labeled by the peer group, and feeding anxieties about an individual's career prospects. Individuals in the Squad were called upon to sacrifice their autonomy and personal interests for sake of the brotherhood. Thus, this 'code of silence' prevents police officers from reporting misconduct. Hence, researching police deviance is a complex undertaking that requires considerable sophistication in both the design and execution of the research.
Finally, the contribution of this paper is to suggest that the utility of our police crime matrix framework for police managers, policy makers and investigating bodies charged with the responsibility of detecting and prosecuting police criminality is twofold. Firstly, this matrix framework reminds such individuals and agencies to be ever mindful of the need to ask the 'right questions' about the nature and extent of alleged incidents of police deviance.
For instance, where a particular incident or example of police crime is to be located on the matrix, as depicted in Figure 1 and scaled in Figure 2 , will of necessity involve a close examination and analysis of each particular incident by the investigating body to determine as far as possible the exact nature and extent of the police deviance under scrutiny and hence its most appropriate categorisation. It is simply just an incident of misconduct or does it reflect more of a corrupt practice and/or does it have a predatory edge to it? These are the types of questions that should be central to any investigation of police deviance. Such questions require credible answers if an investigating body itself is to remain credible in the eyes of the public.
Secondly, the matrix framework can also be used as a Knowledge Management System (KMS) to capture and compare research both between agencies and across countries on police crime. Moreover, it is an application tool for managing the knowledge acquired about police criminality. A discussion of what such a KMS 3 would look like and how it might work is beyond the scope of this paper. Such a discussion can be found in other material written by the principal author.
Conclusion
A review of the extant literature in Australia and in Canada reveals that criminality by police exists in many deviant forms and that it is still very much alive. Furthermore, attempts by police organisations and various watchdog government agencies to root out police deviance is by and large fragmented, episodic in nature, and overly-focused on an individualistic approach to dealing with police crime. Moreover, there is a prevalent and clearly discernable pattern adopted by police organisations and governments alike in dealing with and respond to allegations of police misconduct and corruption in Australia and Canada that does little to restore public confidence in the anti-corruption efforts of these institutions.
We argue that what is needed to move beyond the definitional difficulties involved in researching police crime is an agreed on conceptual framework that delineates the range, diversity and depth of what behaviours are involved in police deviance. Thus, we have adopted a Knowledge Management (KM) approach to researching police crime and its multi-faceted forms of deviance because such a dynamic perspective conceptually locates knowledge about police misconduct and corruption within its own context and culture. Furthermore, we have presented our KM framework as a five-point 'sliding scale' research tool, that is both robust and flexible enough to capture, store and extend the knowledge base of what constitutes police deviance at the level of the individual, the group and the organisational contexts of policing.
Finally, the research potential of this work is discussed in the light of our theoretical understanding and knowledge of the complexities involved in policing the police.
